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	 The	first	steps	towards	an	EU	free	movement	zone	
were	famously	taken	in	1985	when	the	three	Benelux	
countries	plus	Germany	and	France	signed	the	first	
Schengen	agreement	with	the	aim	of	abolishing	
internal	border	controls	between	them.	While	this	first	
agreement	only	devoted	three	articles	to	immigration,	
by	the	time	the	negotiations	on	the	1990	implementing	
Convention	took	place,	it	had	become	a	key	issue	on	
the	agenda.	The	predominant	policy	assumption	at	the	
time	was	that	abolishing	internal	border	controls	would	
lead	to	a	loss	of	security,	including	in	the	context	of	
migration	control,	which	would	need	to	be	offset	 
by	compensatory,	flanking	measures.	
	 This	assumption	was	challenged	from	the	very	
onset.2	Amongst	others,	commentators	drew	attention	
to	the	fact	that	it	rested	on	the	contestable	reasoning	
that	the	control	of	irregular	movements,	including	of	
persons,	happens	primarily	or	most	effectively	at	borders	
instead	of,	e.g.,	by	conducting	stronger	controls	in	
informal	economy	sectors.3	Despite	such	contestation,	
however,	the	assumption	was	central	to	the	debates	
and	policymaking	processes	surrounding	Schengen	in	
the	1990s.	Accordingly,	when	the	final	text	of	the	1990	
implementing	Schengen	Convention	was	adopted,	rules	
on	how	to	provide	stricter	controls	along	the,	now	to	be	
common,	external	borders	had	taken	centre	stage.	As	
the	accompanying	declarations	of	the	signatory	states	
made	clear,	such	stricter	external	border	controls	were	
needed	given	expected	“risks	in	the	fields	of	security	and	
illegal	immigration”.	4	In	that	context,	a	separate	chapter	
(Chapter	7)	was	also	dedicated	to	setting	out	how	the	
responsibility	for	asylum	requests	was	to	be	allocated	
among	the	signatory	states.	Amongst	others,	member	
states	feared	that,	upon	abolishing	internal	border	
controls,	they	would	see	an	increase	of	so-called	 
‘asylum-shopping	movements’,	whereby	asylum	seekers	
would	lodge	their	claims	in	multiple	states,	possibly	
moving	from	one	state	to	another	in	the	event	of	an	
unfavourable	outcome.5 
	 This	latter	set	of	Schengen	rules	was	replaced	by	
almost	identical	ones	in	the	Dublin	Convention,	also	
agreed	to	in	1990.	As	the	preamble	of	the	first	Dublin	
Convention	made	clear,	the	connection	to	Schengen	
was	paramount.	More	precisely,	the	Convention	was	
set	up	in	light	of	the	“joint	objective	of	an	area	without	
internal	frontiers”.6 
	 The	Schengen	rules	on	asylum	applications,	and	
later	those	in	Dublin,	established	–	at	their	core	–	that	
only	one	member	state	would	be	responsible	for	dealing	
with	an	asylum	claim	and	that	a	rejection	in	one	state	
would	automatically	apply	in	all	signatory	states.	Based	
on	this	‘one	state’	premise,	additional	rules	set	out	the	
criteria	for	how	that	responsibility	was	to	be	allocated.	
These	criteria	were	premised	on	prior	links	between	
an	asylum	seeker	and	a	state,	expressed	through,	
for	instance,	the	presence	of	family	members,	the	
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	 Dublin	and	Schengen,	two	of	the	European	Union’s	
(EU)	oldest	and	most	fundamental	accomplishments	
have	come	under	pressure	since	the	large	influx	of	
refugees	in	2015.	As	the	two	systems	were,	from	their	
very	inception,	closely	linked	to	one	another,	it	bears	no	
surprise	that	problems	in	one	(Dublin)	have	spilled	over	
into	the	other	(Schengen).	This	paper	looks	back	at	the	
systems’	historical	and	systemic	connections.	It	then	
traces	the	sequence	of	events	which	put	them	under	
strain	and,	subsequently,	assesses	the	current	state	 
of	affairs.	On	that	basis,	it	argues	that	in	the	absence	 
of	political	leadership,	both	in	the	context	of	the	ongoing	
Dublin	reforms	and	on	the	Schengen	side,	where	internal	
border	controls	are	upheld	long	passed	any	reasonable	
policy	justification,	the	two	systems	risk	going	down	
together.	This	would,	in	turn,	worsen	an	already	sceptic	
public	perception	of	the	EU’s	added	value	in	the	context	
of	managing	the	movement	of	people	across	borders.	
While	problems	in	the	Dublin	system	have	received	
much	public	attention	already,	a	continued	or	worsening	
situation	in	Schengen	will	pose	further	problems	to	the	
EU’s	legitimacy	among	its	citizens,	for	whom	the	‘free	
movement	of	people,	goods	and	services’	represents	 
the	Union’s	most	positive	achievement.1
1.		The	early	days:	from	Schengen	to	Dublin
As the two systems were, from their very 
inception, closely linked to one another, 
it bears no surprise that problems in one 
(Dublin) have spilled over into the other 
(Schengen). 
4	 This	changed	from	the	mid-2000s	onwards.	As	
new	immigration	peaks	were	registered	and	the	EU’s	
geographical	outlook	shifted	following	the	2004	
enlargement,	the	asymmetric	design	of	the	Dublin-
Schengen	system	was	increasingly	rendered	visible.
	 To	begin	with,	the	2004	accession	of	eight	Central	
and	Eastern	European	Countries	(CEEC)	and	two	
Mediterranean	island	countries	moved	the	EU’s	external	
border	eastwards,	from	Germany	towards	the	new	CEEC	
and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	further	southwards	with	the	
accession	of	Cyprus	and	Malta.	In	line	with	the	logic	
described	above,	responsibilities	for	dealing	with	asylum	
requests	moved	further	onto	those	new	EU	member	
states.	Particularly	for	the	CEEC,	the	conditionality	logic	
of	accession	and	the	connected	obligation	to	implement	
the Dublin acquis	meant	that	these	states	became	
“countries	of	immigration	policy	before	they	were	ever	
countries	of	immigration”.12
	 There	was	a	coercive	element	at	play	in	that	their	
accession	to	the	EU,	and	its	highly-valued	Schengen	
free	movement	zone,	was	made	conditional	on	the	
adoption	of	the	Dublin	rules.13	In	more	basic	terms,	and	
2.		The	2000s:	first	cracks	in	Dublin	and	Schengen
possession	of	a	visa	or	residence	permit	issued	 
by	a	state,	or	prior	stays	in	that	state.	The	default	rule,	
however,	applied	when	none	of	the	other	criteria	 
was	met,	assigned	responsibility	to	the	state	through	
which	an	asylum	seeker	first	entered.	On	that	basis,	 
and	as	has	been	abundantly	described	and	criticised	
since,	an	asymmetric	system	was	put	in	place	which	
left	the	states	located	at	the	EU’s	external	borders,	
constituting	the	most	obvious	first	entry	points,	 
with	a	disproportionate	share	of	responsibility.
	 In	spite	of	this	structural	design	flaw,	the	system	
initially	seemed	to	work.	The	reason	for	this,	however,	
was	that	it	did	not	have	to	be	applied	often.	Figures	from	
1998-1999	show	that	only	6%	of	all	asylum	applications	
made	in	the	EU	were	subject	to	a	request	for	transfer	 
to	another	member	state	in	line	with	the	Dublin	rules	 
(so-called	‘Dublin	transfers’).	Given	that	not	all	requests	
were	accepted	by	member	states	and,	additionally,	
that	not	all	acceptances	resulted	in	actual	transfers,	
the	eventual	number	of	asylum	seekers	transferred	
under	Dublin	was	at	a	low	1.7%.7	In	other	words,	the	
overwhelming	majority	of	asylum	applications	were	
taken	charge	of	in	the	states	where	they	were	first	made.	
While	the	numbers	picked	up	in	the	early	2000s,	they	
remained	at	a	low	11.5%	for	requests	made	and	at	only	
4%	when	considering	actual	transfers.8
	 Geographical	realities	play	an	important	role	in	
accounting	for	this	initially	limited	application	of	
the	Dublin	system.	As	Germany	marked	a	significant	
part	of	the	EU’s	external	frontier	at	the	time,	it	was	
an	important	point	of	first	entry	for	asylum	seekers	
arriving	from	the	East	(particularly	in	the	context	 
of	political	turbulence	after	the	dissolution	of	the	
Soviet	bloc).	At	the	same	time,	it	was	also	the	preferred	
destination	country	for	many.9	Given	that	the	first	point	
of	entry	and	preferred	country	of	destination	were	
the	same	in	many	cases,	little	to	no	Dublin	transfers	
were	called	for.10	In	other	words,	in	this	first	phase,	the	
Dublin	system	did	little	more	than	draw	a	framework	
around	already	existent	migration	patterns.	As	a	2001	
Commission	staff	working	document	phrased	it:	 
“it has to be said that the Dublin Convention does not 
affect who takes responsibility for examining an asylum 
application very greatly”.11
in	continuation	of	the	original	policy	premise	informing	
the	link	between	the	two	systems,	access	to	the	Schengen	
border-free	zone	required	participation	in	the	Dublin	
system	of	strict	controls	along	the	external	border.
	 Soon	after	joining,	the	distributional	imbalances	and	
their	shift	towards	the	new	EU	member	states	became	
clear.	European	Commission	figures	for	2005,	for	instance,	
reported	a	strong	inequity	in	the	ratio	of	incoming	versus	
outgoing	Dublin	transfer	requests	for	Poland,	Slovakia	and	
Hungary.	For	these	three	states,	the	incoming	numbers	
far	exceeded	the	outgoing	ones.	The	report	noted	a	
20%	increase	in	the	total	number	of	asylum	seekers	for	
Poland	and	a	10%	increase	for	the	latter	two	states.14 In 
the	hypothetical	case	that	all	transfer	requests	would	
be	carried	out	(see	also	above),	the	increase	in	asylum	
responsibilities	would	amount	to	40%	for	these	three	
states.15	Especially	in	Poland	already	under-resourced	
reception	capacities	were	put	under	further	strain	after	the	
country’s	accession	to	the	EU	and	the	Dublin	system.16
	 However,	the	first	real	cracks	in	the	system	
were	not	registered	in	the	East,	but	in	the	South	
as	increasing	numbers	of	migrant	arrivals	from	
While problems in the Dublin system 
have received much public attention 
already, a continued or worsening 
situation in Schengen will pose further 
problems to the EU’s legitimacy among its 
citizens, for whom the ‘free movement  
of people, goods and services’ represents 
the Union’s most positive achievement.
the	African	continent	led	to	increased	‘first-entry’	
responsibilities	for	the	states	along	the	EU’s	southern	
external	border.17	A	non-exhaustive	overview	of	
such	first	cracks	includes,	amongst	other	things,	the	
situation	in	Malta	in	2006	where,	upon	reports	of	
overwhelmed	reception	facilities,	a	visiting	European	
Parliament	delegation	made	a	note	of	arrival	rates	at	
45%	of	Malta’s	birth	rate,	requiring	the	deployment	of	
10%	of	the	Maltese	army	and	police	force	to	deal	with	
the	humanitarian	emergency	situation.18
	 Similar	situations	were	reported	in	the	Canary	Islands	
that	same	year,	as	record	numbers	of	immigrants	arrived	
across	the	sea	from	Mauritania.19	In	the	meantime,	
accounts	of	overcrowded	facilities	in	Italy	and	Greece	
were	also	making	headlines.20	In	2008,	UNHCR	issued	
a	recommendation	to	refrain	from	returning	asylum	
seekers	to	Greece	under	the	Dublin	rules.21	Two	years	
later,	it	declared	that	the	situation	in	Greece	had	taken	on	
the	nature	of	a	“humanitarian	crisis”.22	In	January	2011,	
the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	found	that	Belgium	
was	in	breach	of	its	Convention	obligations	(notably,	
Article	3	ECHR)	when	returning	an	asylum	seeker	to	
Greece	where	he	would	be	subject	to	conditions	that	
amount	to	degrading	treatment.23
	 Later	that	year,	the	EU	Court	of	Justice	in	
Luxembourg	similarly	established	that	the	EU	Charter	
of	Fundamental	Rights	precluded	Dublin	transfers	
to	a	member	state	where	it	was	clear	that	“systemic	
deficiencies”	in	its	asylum	system	led	to	believe	that	
the	asylum	seeker	faced	a	real	risk	of	being	subjected	to	
inhumane	or	degrading	treatment	(NS).24
	 These	first	cracks	in	the	Dublin	system	led	to	the	
first	cracks	in	the	Schengen	system.	In	2011,	against	
the	background	of	the	high	numbers	of	arrivals	from	
North	Africa	following	the	Arab	spring,	Italy	granted	
temporary	residence	permits	to	Tunisian	immigrants,	
allowing	them	to	travel	freely	in	the	Schengen	area.	
In	response,	and	upon	the	subsequent	movements	of	
some	of	these	Tunisian	immigrants	to	France,	Paris	
unilaterally	reinstated	border	controls	along	its	land	
border	with	Italy.	The	situation	became	tense	as	the	
French	blocked	trains	coming	from	the	Italian	town	 
of	Ventimiglia.	In	what	became	known	as	the	 
“Franco-Italian	Affair”,	Italy’s	interior	minister	 
Roberto	Maroni	explained	the	country’s	actions	by	
stating	that	his	country	had	been	left	alone	to	 
“shoulder	the	immigration	burden”	and	reproached	 
his	EU	counterparts	for	not	“showing	solidarity”.25
3.		The	2015	collapse:	from	Dublin	to	Schengen
	 In	2015,	as	the	Syrian	conflict	entered	its	fourth	 
year,	arrival	numbers	peaked	again	and	Dublin	 
finally	“collapsed	under	its	own	weight”.26	With	 
over	1.2	million	asylum	requests	submitted	in	the	 
EU	–	around	double	the	figure	registered	in	the	
preceding	year27	–	the	system’s	lack	of	a	sustainable	
responsibility-sharing	mechanism	and	the	connected	
limitations	were	painfully	and	definitively	laid	bare.	
Reception	facilities	in	the	states	along	the	EU’s	
southern	as	well	as	eastern	borders	became	structurally	
overwhelmed	resulting	in	mass	‘secondary	movements’	
from	those	first	arrival	states	towards	the	northern	
and	western	states,	particularly	towards	countries	like	
Germany	and	Sweden.	28
	 Faced	with	images	of	caravans	of	asylum	seekers	
arriving	in	Hungary	and	Slovakia	and	in	view	of	the	
mounting	evidence	of	structural	reception	capacity	
problems	there	and	elsewhere,	the	German	federal	
government	unilaterally	suspended	Dublin	returns	for	
Syrian	refugees	in	the	late	summer	of	2015.	Two	weeks	
later,	however,	faced	with	domestic	political	pressures	
as	high	arrival	numbers	were	registered	in	Bavaria,	
Germany	reinstated	checks	along	its	land	border	with	
Austria.	Bavarian	finance	minister	Markus	Söder	had	
publicly	called	for	such	checks	stating	that	“when	the	
EU’s	external	borders	are	not	protected,	the	German	
government	needs	to	think	about	how	it	will	protect	
German	borders”.29
	 This	course	of	events	in	Germany	marked	the	start	 
of	the	spill-over	of	the	Dublin	crisis	into	the	Schengen	
system.	This	spill-over	followed	the	same	policy	
assumption	that	had	originally	linked	one	system	
to	the	other,	that	is:	a	common	free	movement	zone	
requires	strong	external	border	controls.	However,	the	
original	direction	of	the	link	was	reversed:	that	is,	in	the	
absence	of	a	functioning	external	border	control	system	
an	internal	free	movement	zone	could	not	be	upheld.	
Nevertheless,	the	premise	remained	the	same	and,	on	
that	basis,	a	(partial)	suspension	of	Dublin	was	seen	as	
necessitating	a	(partial)	suspension	of	Schengen.
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As arrival numbers have dropped since 2016, 
with them, dangerously, the sense of urgency 
was reduced for this latter group of states.37
	 A	chain	reaction	followed	after	Germany’s	
reinstatement	of	border	controls.	Beginning	with	
Austria	and	Slovenia	(September	2015),	other	states	also	
re-introduced	border	checks,	initially	to	avoid	becoming	
‘culs-de-sac’	where	asylum	seekers	could	get	stranded.30 
Between	October	and	December,	France,	Hungary,	
64.		Dublin	and	Schengen:	a	tale	of	mutual	dependency
	 Writing	in	early	June	2018,	the	cards	are	stacked	
unfavourably	for	a	political	solution	to	be	found	soon.	
On	the	Dublin	side,	discussions	on	a	relocation	scheme,	
aimed	at	finally	inserting	the	much-needed	redistributive	
and	responsibility-sharing	element	into	the	system,	 
have	been	a	source	of	political	contention	since	 
mid-2015.	The	Visegrád	countries	(Poland,	Hungary,	
Slovakia	and	the	Czech	Republic)	have	consistently	and	
vocally	opposed	all	proposals	which	would	include	a	
mandatory	relocation	mechanism.33	They	were	recently	
joined	by	Austria,	next	in	line	to	take	over	the	EU	Council	
presidency	in	the	second	half	of	2018	and	originally	
amongst	the	strongest	defenders	of	a	mandatory	
relocation	system	when	such	proposals	were	first	made.34 
The	states	along	the	EU’s	southern	border,	on	the	other	
hand,	strongly	favour	a	mandatory	relocation	mechanism	
as	was	recently	further	exposed	in	a	leaked	non-paper.35 
Italy’s	new	government	has	been	particularly	outspoken	
in	this	respect,	both	in	its	coalition	agreement	and	in	
the	media.36	Caught	in	the	middle	are	the	northern	and	
western	European	states,	which,	except	for	large	net	
receivers	such	as	Germany	and	Sweden,	have	an	interest	
to	maintain	the	status quo.	As	arrival	numbers	have	
dropped	since	2016,	with	them,	dangerously,	the	sense	 
of	urgency	was	reduced	for	this	latter	group	of	states.37
	 On	the	Schengen	side,	the	continued	internal	border	
controls	can	no	longer	be	justified	on	the	basis	of	sincere	
public	policy	considerations.	Instead,	the	more	time	
passes,	the	more	it	becomes	clear	that	there	is	only	a	
limited	value,	in	policy	terms,	to	these	controls.	On	that	
basis,	the	controls	seem	to	be	predominantly	informed	
by	electorate-pleasing	political	motivations	of	a	short-
sighted	nature.	While	exact	figures	are	hard	to	come	
by,	the	European	Commission	reported	in	September	
2017	that	onward	secondary	movements	of	asylum	
seekers	had,	in	any	event,	become	“limited”	(European	
Commission,	2017).38	Nevertheless,	member	states’	most	
recent	notifications	to	prolong	border	controls	continue	
to	refer	to	the	risk	of	secondary	movements,	amongst	
others,	because	large	numbers	of	asylum	seekers	are	still	
in	Greece.39	This	continued	presence,	in	turn,	cannot	be	
addressed	without	a	structural	reform	of	the	Dublin-based	
responsibility-sharing	principles.	On	that	basis,	the	debate	
comes	full	circle	again.	
	 In	the	absence	of	a	durable	and	prompt	solution,	
the	future	looks	bleak.	As	the	systems’	interconnected	
historical	development	shows	Dublin	and	Schengen	
are	mutually	dependent,	linked	through	the	policy	
assumption	that	an	internal	free	movement	zone	
requires	a	common	control	regime	along	the	external	
border.	As	highlighted	at	the	beginning	of	the	text,	this	
policy	assumption	can	and	has	been	contested.	Despite	
these	objections,	however,	and	as	the	2015	events	have	
shown	–	or	earlier	on,	the	2011	Franco-Italian	affair	or	
the	conditionality	dynamics	in	the	2004	enlargement	
–	this	assumption	has	continued	to	dominate	thinking	
in	political	and	policymaking	circles.	As	long	as	that	
is	the	case,	the	fall	of	one	(Dublin)	will	likely	entail	
a	gradual	fall	of	the	other	(Schengen).	This	would	
subsequently	pose	major	risks	to	the	EU’s	legitimacy	
among	its	citizens,	who	consider	the	“free	movement	
of	people,	goods	and	services”	to	be	the	Union’s	most	
positive	achievement,	even	surpassing	that	of	“peace	
amongst	the	member	states”.40
Sweden	and	Norway	(in	that	respective	order)	also	
introduced	internal	border	checks.	They	were	followed	
by	Denmark	and	Belgium	in	early	2016,	leading	to	a	
total	of	nine	countries	that	reintroduced	border	checks	
in	the	Schengen	zone	at	that	time.
	 Like	Germany,	these	member	states	predominantly	 
cited	a	“fear	of	secondary	movements”	of	asylum-
seekers	as	their	justification	for	the	reintroduction	 
of	border	controls	to	the	Commission.31	More	than	
two	and	a	half	years	later,	six	states	(Austria,	Germany,	
France,	Sweden,	Denmark	and	Norway)	still	uphold	
internal	border	checks.	Their	practice	of	accumulating	
different	legal	bases	for	introducing	what	are	intended	
to	be	‘temporary’	checks,	as	well	as	the	limited	
justifications	provided	for	doing	so,	have	been	the	
source	of	much	controversy	and	the	subject	of	charges	
of	unlawful	behaviour.32
Political leadership and conciliatory 
thinking are urgently called for, both in the 
context of the Dublin discussions as on the 
Schengen side where a more responsible 
engagement with one of the EU’s most 
foundational accomplishments is pressing. 
	 This	slippery	slope	downwards	seems	well	on	its	
way.	Hopes	for	reaching	a	consensus	premised	on	a	 
sustainable	and	structural	solution	at	the	upcoming	 
June	Council	summit	are	fading	as	more	time	passes.
	 Political	leadership	and	conciliatory	thinking	are	
urgently	called	for,	both	in	the	context	of	the	Dublin	
discussions	as	on	the	Schengen	side	where	a	more	
responsible	engagement	with	one	of	the	EU’s	most	
foundational	accomplishments	is	pressing.	
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